Secret handshake allows a group of authorized users to establish a shared secret key and at the same time authenticate each other anonymously. A straightforward approach to design an unlinkable secret handshake protocol is to use either long-term certificate or one-time certificate provided by a trusted authority. However, how to detect the misusing of certificates by an insider adversary is a challenging security issue when using those approaches for unlinkable secret handshake. In this paper, we propose a novel k-time authenticated secret handshake (k-ASH) protocol where each authorized user is only allowed to use the credential for k times. We formalize security models, including session key security and anonymity, for k-ASH, and prove the security of the proposed protocol under some computational problems which are proved hard in the generic bilinear group model. The proposed protocol also achieved public traceability property if a user misuses the k-time credential.
Introduction
Secret handshake is a useful cryptographic primitive and has been extensively studied in the literature. It allows an authorized user to share a secret key with others without revealing their real identities. The following scenario can clarify its practicality. A FBI agent wants to contact with another agent, and both of them do not want to disclose their identity information during interaction. The only information they need to know is the peer belongs to the same agent system. There have been two types of unlinkable secret handshake system in the literature: one is based on the long-term certificate (e.g., [14, 15] ), and the other is based on one-time certificate (e.g., [16] ). In the former type, the authorized user generates the shared secret value using the secret long-term certificate given by a trusted authority (TA) of the organization. In the latter type, the long-term secret value will be replaced by a set of one-time certificates and the authorized user will use one of them for unlinkable secret handshake in each session.
For the long-term certificate, an authorized user is allowed to reuse the given certificate when establishing a secret value with another authorized user. For example, the given secret certificate is blended with Diffie-Hellman key exchange, in order to generate a secret key with forward secrecy (e.g., [14, 15] ). Since the same certificate is used everytime, how to ensure the unlinkability is the major challenge in the protocol design. On the other hand, the one-time certificate approach (e.g., [16] ) can address the unlinkability easily since each certificate is supposed to be used only once. Nevertheless, none of the previous approaches has considered the issue of misusing of certificates. We should note that for the one-time certificate schemes, the user is supposed to use each certificate once. However, reusing the given one-time certificates is a security issue that has not been formally considered in the previous works.
We give an example where misusing of the certificates (or credentials) should be prevented in secret handshake in some scenarios. Suppose there are n players subscribed to a real-time gaming system. Each user will obtain a set of k credentials from the game server after paying a subscription fee that is proportional to k. The players can form ad-hoc groups to play the game and a player can join a gaming session using one credential at a time. In order to ensure that only registered players are eligible to communicate with the peers, the players should generate a common session key to protect the communication. Also, it is desirable that the players cannot recognize each other except the fact that they are all legitimate subscribers of the system. Therefore, we may use a multi-party secret handshake protocol to achieve the security and privacy goals. However, in this example, a malicious player may try to reuse his credentials to continue playing the game without topping up extra money after all the credentials are used up. Therefore, it is important to identify such cheating players who reuse their one-time credentials. However, we found that the misusing of credentials has not been formally addressed in the previous secret handshake schemes. In this paper, we focus on addressing the credential misusing problem under the one-time certificate setting, and leave the task of designing such a scheme under the long-term certificate setting as our future work.
This work
In this paper, we introduce the notion of k-time authenticated secret handshake (k-ASH), allowing all authorized users in a system to agree on a common secret value anonymously while preventing them from misusing their credentials issued by a trusted party of the system. Our contributions can be summarized as follows:
1. We present the formal security definition for k-time ASH protocol. In particular, we extend the eCK model [21] to define session key security and a variant of Juels-Weis privacy model [17] to define user anonymity. 2. We present a new unlinkable k-time ASH using anonymized Schnorr signature [22] and tag bases [25] to trace the cheating users who reuse their one-time credentials.
3. We prove a variant of the Computational Diffie-Hellman problem (VoCDH) and an extension of Decisional Combined Bilinear Diffie-Hellman problem (EVoDCBDH) [27] in the generic bilinear group model, and prove the security of the new k-time ASH protocol under these assumptions.
Related work
Key Exchange. Bellare and Rogaway [6] introduced the first complexitytheoretic security model for key exchange under the symmetric-key setting. The model was later extended and enhanced under different contexts [7, 2, 5] . Canetti and Krawczyk [11] later refined the previous models and proposed a new model, known as the CK model, which is widely used in the analysis of many well-known key exchange protocols. Some variants [20, 21] of CK model were also proposed to allow an adversary to obtain either long-term secret key or ephemeral secret key of the challenge session. Burmester and Desmedt [10] (BD) introduced several key exchange protocols in the multi-party setting, including star-based, broadcast-based, tree-based, and cyclic-based protocols. Later, a few generic transformations [19, 18, 8] were proposed to convert passive-secure group key exchange protocols into active-secure ones.
Secret Handshakes. Balfanz et al [1] introduced the concept of secret handshake that allows any users in the same group to generate a shared value secretly using the long-term certificate approach. Afterwards, Castelluccia et al [12] constructed a more efficient scheme than [1] under the standard Computational Diffie-Hellman Assumption. But both schemes did not provide the unlinkability property. In [26] , Xu and Yung provided an unlinkable scheme but with weaker anonymity, named k-unlinkability, which means in the worst case, an adversary can infer that a participant is one out of certain k users. For achieving the full anonymity, Jarecki et al [16] proposed two group secret handshake protocols using the BD group key agreement protocol (e.g., [10] ). In particular, the second construction in [16] used one-time certificate to achieve full anonymity under the Gap Diffie-Hellman Assumption. Meanwhile, several secret handshake protocols have been proposed in the literature (e.g., [14, 15] ) which achieved full anonymity without using one-time certificate. The protocol in [15] and the improvement protocol in [14] are long-time certificate based, and both of them are allowed to reuse the given certificate with unlimited number of times.
Security Model
In this section, we present the security models for k-ASH. As mentioned in the introduction, a secure k-ASH protocol should achieve both session key security and anonymity. Below we present the corresponding security models to capture the above requirements. Specifically, the session key security model is a modified version of eCK model [21] , which is an extension of CK model [11] in the secret handshake setting, while the anonymity model is extended from the privacy models ( [17, 24] ) for RFID authentication protocols.
States. We define a system user set U with n users, i.e. |U| = n. We say an oracle Π i U may be used or unused. The oracle is considered as unused if it has never been initialized. Each unused oracle Π i U can be initialized with a secret key x. The oracle is initialized as soon as it becomes part of a group. After the initialization the oracle is marked as used and turns into the stand-by state where it waits for an invocation to execute a protocol operation. Upon receiving such invocation the oracle Π i U learns its partner identifier pid i U and turns into a processing state where it sends, receives and processes messages according to the description of the protocol. During that stage, the internal state information state i U is maintained by the oracle. The oracle Π i U remains in the processing state until it collects enough information to compute the session key K i U . As soon as K i U is computed Π i U accepts and terminates the protocol execution meaning that it would not send or receive further messages. If the protocol execution fails then Π i U terminates without having accepted.
Partnering. We denote the i-th session established by a user U by Π i U , and identities of all the users recognized by Π i U during the execution of that session by pid i U . We define sid i U as the unique session identifier belonging to the session i established by the user U . Specifically, sid i U = {m j } n j=1 , where m j ∈ {0, 1} * is the message transcript among users. We say two instance oracles Π i U and Π j U are partners if and only if pid i U = pid j U and sid i U = sid j U .
System Model
We define a k-time authenticated secret handshake protocol consists of the following algorithms:
-Setup: The algorithm takes the security parameter λ as input, outputs the master public parameters mpk (including the k-time tag bases) and the master secret keys msk. -KeyGen: The algorithm takes the master public key mpk as input, outputs a public/secret key pair (X, x). -Register: This is an interactive algorithm that executed between the user and the TA. TA takes the master secret key msk and a public key X of one user as input, outputs a set of credentials {s i } k i=1 on X. The user will become a registered user after interaction with TA.
-Handshake: This is an interactive algorithm that executed by registered users.
Each user takes his/her secret key x, one of his/her credentials {s i } k i=1 and mpk as input, outputs a shared secret key K if and only if his/her counterparts are registered users.
-Tracing: The algorithm takes two handshake transcripts of one user and one of tag bases as input, outputs the user's public key X.
Session Key Security
We define the session key security model for k-ASH protocols, in which each user obtains a set of credentials associated with his/her public key from the TA, and establishes a session key using one of the given secret credentials in one session. The model is defined via a game between a probabilistic polynomial time (PPT) adversary A and a simulator S. A is an active attacker with full control of the communication channel among all the users.
-Setup: S first generates master public/secret key pair (mpk, msk) for the TA and long-term secret keys {x i } n i=1 for n users by running the corresponding KeyGen algorithms, where x i denotes the secret key of user i. In addition, S generates a set of secret credentials {s i,j } k j=1 for user i by running the Register algorithm. S also tosses a random coin b which will be used later in the game. Let U denote all the registered users.
-Training: A can make the following queries in arbitrary sequence to simulator S.
• Establish: A is allowed to register a user U with public key X i . If a user is registered by A, then we call this user dishonest; Otherwise, it is honest. • Send: If A issues send query in the form of (U, i, m) to simulate a network message for the i-th session of user U , then S would simulate the reaction of instance oracle Π i U upon receiving message m, and returns to A the response that Π i U would generate; If A issues send query in the form of (U, start ), then S creates a new instance oracle Π i U and returns to A the first protocol message.
• Session key reveal: A can issue reveal query to an accepted instance oracle Π i U . If the session is accepted, then S will return the session key to A; Otherwise, a special symbol '⊥' is returned to A. • Ephemeral secret key reveal: If A issues an ephemeral secret key reveal query to (possibly unaccepted) instance oracle Π i U , then S will return all ephemeral secret values contained in Π i U at the moment the query is asked. • long term secret key reveal: If A issues a long term secret key reveal (or corrupt, for short) query to user i, then S will return both the long term secret key and the secret credential set (x i , {s i,j } k j=1 ) to A. • Master secret key reveal: If A issues a master secret key reveal query to TA, then S will return the master secret keys msk to A. • Test: This query can only be made to an accepted and fresh (as defined below) session i of a user U . Then S does the following: * If the coin b = 1, S returns the real session key to the adversary; * Otherwise, a random session key is drawn from the session key space and returned to the adversary. Note that A can generate a set of secret credentials {s i,j } k j=1 of user i after issuing Master secret key reveal query to TA. It is also worth noting that A can continue to issue other queries after the Test query. However, the test session must maintain fresh throughout the entire game. Finally, A outputs b as its guess for b. If b = b, then the simulator outputs 1; Otherwise, the simulator outputs 0.
Freshness. We say an accepted instance oracle Π i U is fresh if A does not perform any of the following actions during the game:
-A issues Session key reveal query to Π i U or its accepted partnered instance oracle Π j U ; -A issues both Long term secret key reveal query to U s.t. U ∈ pid i U and Ephemeral secret key reveal query for an instance Π j U partnered with Π i U ; -A issues Long term secret key reveal query to user U s.t. U ∈ pid i U prior to the acceptance of instance Π i U and there exists no instance oracle Π j U partnered with Π i U . Note that the Master key reveal query to TA is equivalent to the Long term secret key reveal to all users in pid i U . We define the advantage of an adversary A in the above game as
We say a k-ASH protocol has session key security if for any PPT A, Adv A (λ) is a negligible function of the security parameter λ.
Anonymity
Informally, an adversary is not allowed to identify who are the handshake users, with the condition that honest users authenticate with each other within k times. We define a game between an insider adversary A and a simulator S as follows:
-Setup: S generates master public/secret key pairs (mpk, msk) for the TA and long term secret keys {x i } n i=1 for n users by running the corresponding KeyGen algorithms. In addition, S generates a set of secret credentials {s i,j } k j=1 for user i by running the Register algorithm. S also tosses a random coin b which will be used later in the game. We denote the original n users set as U.
-Training: A is allowed to issue Establish, Send, Ephemeral secret key reveal,
Session key reveal and at most n-2 Long term secret key reveal queries to S. We denote the honest (i.e., uncorrupted) user set as U . -Challenge: A randomly selects two users U i , U j ∈ U as challenge candidates, then S remove them from U and simulates
Note that A is allowed to activate at most k sessions for U i , U j throughout the entire game.
, then the simulator outputs 1; Otherwise, the simulator outputs 0.
We define the advantage of A in the above game as
Definition 2. We say a k-ASH protocol has anonymity if for any PPT A, Adv A (λ) is a negligible function of the security parameter λ.
Preliminaries
Bilinear Map. The bilinear mapê : G × G → G 1 has the following properties:
2. Non-degeneracy:ê(g, g) = 1. 3. Computable: There exists an efficient algorithm for computing the bilinear map.
Note that the mapê is symmetric sinceê(g αi , g αj ) =ê(g, g) αi·αj =ê(g αj , g αi ).
Modified Computational Diffie-Hellman Problem
Definition 3. Computational Diffie-Hellman (CDH) Assumption [20] :
we define the advantage of the adversary in solving the CDH problem as
We say a CDH assumption holds in group G if for any PPT A, Adv A (λ) is a negligible function of the security parameter λ.
We propose a variant of computational diffie-hellman problem (VoCDH) below.
Definition 4. Given g, g a , g 1/a , g b ∈ G where a, b ∈ R Z q , we define the advantage of the adversary in solving the VoCDH problem as
We prove the above VoCDH problem is hard in G with a bilinear mapê : G×G → G 1 in the generic bilinear group model [23, 9] .
If a, b are uniformly and independently chosen from F p and encodings 1 , 2 are randomly chosen, we then define the advantage of the adversary in solving the VoCDH with at most q, q 1 queries to the group operation oracles O, O 1 and qê queries to the bilinear pairing oracle Oê
Proof. Let S be the simulator to simulate the entire game for A. S maintains two polynomial sized dynamic lists:
, 1} * are corresponding arbitrary strings, S then sets those pairs (p i , 1,i ) as L 1 . Therefore, the two lists are initialised as
At the beginning of the game, S sends { 1,i } i=0,··· ,3 to A. After this, S simulates the group operation oracle O, O 1 and the bilinear pairing oracle Oê as follows. We assume that all requested operands are obtained from S.
-O: The group operation involves two operands 1,i , 1,j . Based on these operands, S searches the list L 1 for the corresponding polynomials p i and p j . Then S perform the polynomial addition or subtraction p l = p i ± p j depending on whether multiplication or division is requested. If p l is in the list L 1 , then S returns the corresponding l to A. Otherwise, S uniformly chooses 1,l ∈ R {0, 1} * , where 1,l is unique in the encoding string L 1 , and appends the pair (p l , 1,l ) into the list L 1 . Finally, S returns 1,l to A as the answer. Group operation queries in G 1 (i.e., O 1 ) is treated similarly. -Oê: The group operation involves two operands 1,i , 1,j . Based on these operands, S searches the list L 1 for the corresponding polynomials p i and p j . Then S perform the polynomial multiplication p l = p i · p j . If p l is in the list L 2 , then S returns the corresponding 2,l to A. Otherwise, S uniformly chooses 2,l ∈ R {0, 1} * , where 2,l is unique in the encoding string L 2 , and appends the pair (p l , 2,l ) into the list L 2 . Finally, S returns 2,l to A as the answer.
After querying at most q, q 1 , q e times of corresponding oracles, A terminates and outputs 1 (x 1 · x 2 ). At this point, S chooses random a, b ∈ R F p and sets X 1 = a, X 2 = b. The simulation by S is perfect unless the abort event happens. Thus, we bound the probability of event abort by analyzing the following cases:
is a non-zero polynomial of degree 0, 1, or p − 2 where p − 2 is produced by
is a non-zero polynomial of degree 0, 1, or 2. Therefore, the maximum degree of X 1 (p i −p j ) is 2. By using lemma 1 in [23] , we have Pr[(X 1 (p i − p j ))(a, b) = 0] ≤ 2 p and thus Pr[p i (a, b) = p j (a, b)] ≤ 2 p . As there are q+4 2 pairs of (p i , p j ), we have the abort probability is Pr
Since q i = q j as the method of L 2 is generated and q i , q j are in the form of a k,l p k p j for some constants a k,l , q i − q j is a non-zero polynomial of degree 0, 1, 2, p−1, p−2, or 2p−4. Similar to above case, we have
is a non-zero polynomial of degree ranging from 0 to 4. Since the maximum degree of X 2 1 (q i −q j ) is 4, we have Pr[(X 2 1 (q i −q j ))(a, b) = 0] ≤ 4 p and thus Pr[q i (a, b) = q j (a, b)] ≤ 4 p . As there are q1+q e 2 pairs of (q i , q j ), we have the abort probability is Pr[abort 2 ] ≤ q1+q e 2 · 4 p .
3. p i (a, b) = ab: Since the degree of p 1 is 0, 1, or p − 2, and the degree of X 1 X 2 is 2, we have that p i − X 1 X 2 is a non-zero polynomial of degree 2 or p − 2.
Similar to the case 1, we have X 1 (p i − X 1 X 2 ) is a non-zero polynomial of maximum degree of 3. Therefore, we have Pr 
The VoDCBDH problem is a variant of Decisional Combined Bilinear Diffie-Hellman Problem [27] . We prove the VoDCBDH problem is hard in G with a bilinear mapê : G × G → G 1 in the generic bilinear group model [23, 9] . To prove this theorem, we introduce an intermediate problem (see Lemma 2), and we prove that the hardness of intermediate problem implies the hardness of the VoDCBDH problem. After that, we prove the intermediate problem is intractable (see Lemma 1) and then the theorem follows. Definition 6. Given g, g d , g cd , g d 2 , g e , g ae , g be ∈ G where a, b, c, d, e ∈ R Z p and g ∈ R G, the modified problem is to distinguish g abe+cd 2 from a random element Z ∈ R G. The advantage of an adversary A to solve the modified problem is defined as
Adv Modified A (λ) = Pr[w = A(g, g d , g cd , g d 2 , g e , g ae , g be , Proof. The simulator S obtains an instanceθ = (ĝ,ĝd,ĝĉd,ĝd 2 ,ĝê,ĝâê,ĝbê, T 0 , T 1 ).
Then S checks whetherĝd = 1 or not. Ifĝd = 1, that isd = 0, the simulator S returns w = 0 if e(ĝâê,ĝbê) = e(T 0 ,ĝê) or returns w = 1 otherwise, and solvesθ with the probability of 1. Ifĝd = 1, the simulator S continues and sets θ = (g, g a , g b , h, h c , h d , h Proof. The modified problem is an instance of Decisional Bilinear (P, f )-Diffie-Hellman problem family [27] where P = (p 1 , . . . , p 7 ) = (1, d, cd, d 2 , e, ae, be) and f = abe + cd 2 . We show that f is not dependent on P by contradiction. Assume f is dependent on P that by definition in [27] there exists 57 constants a i,j , b k , and c that
where at least one of b k or c is non-zero. We analyze the above equation in two cases.
1. c = 0: In this case, there is a term f 2 = a 2 b 2 e 2 + 2abcd 2 e + c 2 d 4 in Q.
Furthermore, the term a 2 b 2 e 2 is not in any combination of p k f or p i p j , then f 2 cannot be canceled out. Hence, we have Q = 0 if c = 0. 2. c = 0: In this case, we have
7 j=1 a i,j p i p j where at least one of b k is non-zero. In other words, Q has at least a term p k f = p k (abe + cd 2 ) = p k abe + p k cd 2 . As Q = 0, both two terms p k abe and p k cd 2 should be canceled out. In the first step, we focus on the term p k abe. There are two methods to cancel the term p k abe.
(a) To cancel with p k f = p k abe + p k cd 2 where k = k , we have p k abe = p k cd 2 , that is, p k = θcd 2 and p k = θabe for some polynomial θ. Since no such pair of p k and p k in P , we cannot cancel p k abe via p k f . (b) To cancel with p i p j , we have p k abe = p i p j . By observing P , the only polynomial which has a is p 6 = ae. Thus we have p k abe = p 6 p j ⇐⇒ p k b = p j . By observing P again, the only polynomial which has b is p 7 = be. Thus we have p k = e = p 5 . Therefore, p k abe can be canceled out when k = 5. To further cancel out p 5 f , the term p 5 cd 2 = cd 2 e has to be canceled out. As before, there are two methods to cancel the term cd 2 e. (a) To cancel with p k f = p k abe + p k cd 2 where k = 5, we have p k abe = cd 2 e.
Since the term cd 2 ab is not in P , we cannot cancel out the term cd 2 e. (b) To cancel with p i p j , we have p i p j = cd 2 e. By observing P , the only polynomial, which has c is p 3 = cd. Thus we have p i p 3 = cd 2 e ⇐⇒ p i = de. Since the term de is not in P , we cannot cancel out the term cd 2 e. Since it is impossible to cancel out any term p k f , we have Q = 0 if c = 0.
To sum up, it is impossible to make Q = 0, which contradicts the assumption. Therefore, we have f is not dependent on P . By the theorem 1 in [27] , we directly have the lemma.
By combining the Lemma 1 and Lemma 2, we have
Extended Decisional Combined Bilinear Diffie-Hellman Problem
We propose an extension of variant of Decisional Combined Bilinear Diffie-Hellman Problem below.
Definition 7. Extended variant of Decisional Combined Bilinear Diffie-Hellman (EVoDCBDH) Assumption: Given g, g a , g b , g e , g f , h c , h d , h 1/d , h l ∈ G where a, b, c, d, e, f, l ∈ R Z q and h = g e , we define the advantage of the adversary in solving the EVoDCBDH problem as
Theorem 3. We say a EVoDCBDH assumption holds in group G if for any PPT A, Adv A (λ) is a negligible function of the security parameter λ.
Proof. Let S denote the VoDCBDH problem solver, who is given (g a , g b , g e , g f , h c , h d , h 1/d , h l ), and aims to distinguish T = g ab · h cd from another value g bf · h dl . S simulates the game for A as follows.
-Setup: S chooses f, l ∈ R Z q and computes g f , h l , then generates other public parameters using the given instances and sends them to A. S also tosses a random coin w which will be used later in the game. -Challenge stage: S returns the challenge T if b = 0; Otherwise, returns the value g bf · h dl to A. Note that the value T comes from his own challenger. Finally, A outputs w as its guess for w. If w = w, then S outputs 1; Otherwise, S outputs 0. Probability analysis: Since the value T from its challenger can be either g ab ·h cd or R, thus we have
Exponent Challenge Response Signature
We firstly review the Exponent Challenge-Response signature, which will be used in our k-ASH protocol.
Definition 8. The Exponential Challenge-Response (XCR) signature scheme [20] . The signer possess a public/secret key pair (g a , a) (a ∈ Z q ). A verifier provides a message m together with a challenge g w (w ∈ Z q is chosen by verifier). The signature produced by signer using challenge g w is defined as (g w , g w (w+a·H(g w ||m)) ) (w ∈ Z q is chosen by signer). Then the verifier accepts a signature pair (g w , σ) as valid iff g w = 0 and σ = (g w · g a·H(g w ||m) ) w .
Our k-ASH protocol
Now we present our proposed unlinkable secret handshake with k-time authentication protocol in the two party setting (without loss of generality, we use user A and user B here). It works as follows:
-Setup: TA takes the security parameter λ and the number of handshakes k as input, outputs the master public key mpk = (g, h, {g ti } i=k i=1 , h α , h 1/α ), and the master secret key msk = ({t i } i=k i=1 , α). TA also generates four hash functions
-KeyGen: User A chooses x a ∈ Z q and computes g xa as his/her public key.
-Register: User A submits his/her public key g xa to TA. TA then chooses w ai ∈ Z q and computes s ai = w ai +α ·H 1 (h wa i ||ê(g xa , h α ) ti ) and returns a credential set
to user A. While user A can verify them using the following equations: • User A chooses the ephemeral secret key r a ∈ R Z q , computes R a = h r a = h H2(ra||xa||sa i ) and sends it to user B;
• User B performs the following. * Choose the ephemeral secret key 
, where e * b = H 3 (R b ||e bi ), s * a = s ai · e * a + r a , e * a = H 3 (R a ||e ai ), e ai = H 1 (h wa i ||C ai ); * Send g ti , h wa i , C ai , C ai , e a to user B. Note that the computation of C ai , C ai by user A follows the same procedures as above.
• User B verifies the received message using the same method as user A, and computes the session key
Note that the computation of session key used the XCR signature from [20] .
-Tracing
If user A used the same credential twice, e.g., ( C ai , e ai ) and ( C ai , e ai ), then anyone can compute g ti·xa = [(g ti·xa · h sa i ·ea i /α ) e a i / (g ti·xa · h sa i ·e a i /α ) ea i ] 1/(e a i −ea i ) , where e ai = H 3 (R ra ), e ai = H 3 (R ra ). That means if user A reused a credential, then user A' identity can be revealed sinceê(g ti·xa , g) =ê(g ti , g xa ) for public key g xa .
Security Analysis

Session Key Security
Theorem 4. The proposed k-ASH protocol achieves session key security (Definition 1) in the random oracle model if the VoCDH assumption is held in the underlying group G.
Proof. We define a sequence of games G i , i = 0, · · · , 3 and let Adv k−ASH i denote the advantage of the adversary in game G i . Assume that A activates at most m (perhaps m ≥ k) sessions in each game.
-G 0 This is original game for session key security.
-G 1 This game is identical to game G 0 except that S will output a random bit if the nonce R i is used twice by two different instance oracles. Therefore, we have:
-G 2 This game is identical to game G 1 except that S will output a random bit if Forge event happens where A made a send query in the form of (h r0 , g ti , h w0 ,ê(h α , g ti ) xi , g ti·xi · h s0·H3(R * r 0 )/α , H 3 (R * ·r0 )) and an H 4 query with a valid forgery σ = R * s * 0 = R * [s0·H3(h r 0 ||H1(h w 0 ||ê(h α ,g t i ) x i ))+r0] for challenge R * , such that user i is not corrupted (i.e., no Long term secret key reveal query to user i or Master secret key reveal query to TA) when the hash query is made. Then we have:
Lemma 3. The Forge event happens only with a negligible probability when the VoCDH assumption is held in G.
Let S denote the VoCDH problem solver, who is given h a , h 1/a , h b , and aims to compute h ab . S simulates the game for A as follows:
• Setup stage: F sets up the game for A by creating n users (set U) with the corresponding public/secret key pairs {X i , x i } n i=1 . F randomly selects an index i and guesses that the Forge event will happen with regard to user i and session i. S then sets the mpk as h α = h a , h 1/α = h 1/a and generates other public parameters honestly. In addition, S sets the challenge as R * = h b in the guessed session i, S simulates the game for A as follows.
• S answers A's queries as follows:
* If A issues establish query in the form of (U , X ), such that U / ∈ U, then user U with public key X will be added to the system. * If A issues a send query in the form of (h r , g ti , h w ,ê(h a , g ti ) x , g ti·x · h (s ·e )/a ) to user i, then S verifies it successfully (notice that A may corrupt a user with secret key x and secret signature pair (h w , s )), and next to generating the signatures (h wi , s i ) as follows:
Then, S chooses r i ∈ Z q and computes e = H 3 (h r ·r i ). Eventually, S generates the message (h r i , g ti , h wi , C i , g ti·xi · h (si·e)/a , e) and sends it to A. * If A issues an ephemeral secret key reveal query to instance oracle Π i Ui , then S returns the ephemeral value r i (r i = H 2 (r i ||x i ||s i )) to A. * If A issues a long term secret key reveal query to user j ( = i), then S returns x j and secret signatures {s j } k j=1 to A. Note that S can simulate secret signatures (h wj , s j ) of user j ( = i) using the same method that described above. If A issues a long term secret key reveal key query to user i or a master secret key reveal key query to TA, then abort. * Session key reveal query and Test query: S answers the session key reveal query and the test query by using the session key it has derived during the protocol simulation described above. • When Forge event occurs (i.e., A outputs: h r0 , g ti , h w0 ,ê(h a , g ti ) xi , g ti·xi · h (s0·H3(h b·r 0 ))/a , H 3 (h b·r0 )), S checks whether: 1. The Forge event with respect to user i on challenge h b ; 2. Verifies:ê
Note that the value D is used to compute session key K(= H 4 (D)), e 0 = H 3 (h r0 ||e 1 ). If all the above conditions hold, S confirms it as a successful forgery from H 4 and proceeds:
According to the forking lemma [4] , by rewinding the adversary twice, S would obtain four forgeries from H 4 , which will be listed below.
Therefore, S can perform the computation below to obtain a solution to VoCDH.
The simulation performed by S is perfect. Since at most n users and m sessions in the game, we have:
- 
It is easy to see that in game G 3 , A has no advantage, i.e., Adv k−ASH 3 = 0 (7)
Combining the above results together, we have
Anonymity
Theorem 5. The proposed k-ASH protocol achieves anonymity (Definition 2) in the random oracle model if the EVoDCBDH Assumption is held in the underlying group G.
Proof. Let S denote a EVoDCBDH problem distinguisher, who is given (g, h, g a , g b , g f , h c , h d , H 1/d , h l ), and aims to distinguish g ab · h cd and g bf · h dl . S simulates the game for A as follows.
-Setup: S sets up the game for A by creating n users. S sets h α = h 1/d , h 1/α = h d (the msk = (α, 1/α) are implicitly set as (1/d, d) respectively), and randomly selects one tag base g t * = g b and generates other tag bases honestly (i.e., g ti , t i ∈ Z q is chosen by S). In addition, S randomly chooses users i, j from user set U and sets g xi = g a , g xj = g f (the secret keys (x i , x j ) are implicitly set as (a, f ) respectively), and generates public/secret key pair for other users honestly.
-If A issues a send query in the form of (R , g ti , h w , C b , C b ) to user i, then S performs the simulation as follows.
• S simulates the signature pair (h wi , s i ) using the same method that described in Lemma 3; • S computes C i = g a·ti · h d·si·e i , and C i =ê(h 1/d , g a ) ti , where e i = H 3 (R ri ), r i ∈ Z q ; • S generates R i = h ri and sets e i = H 1 (h wi ||C i ); • S returns (R i , g ti , h wi , C i , C i , e i ) to user A as the response. Note that S can simulate the response of user j using the same method as above.
-It is easy to see that all queries to other users can be simulated perfectly using the user secret keys, and S can simulate secret credentials using the same method as described in Lemma 3. -Challenge: If A issues a send query in the form of (R, g ti , h w , C i , C i ) to user i, then S computes C i = (g ba ·h dc ) e * and C i =ê(
, where e * = H 3 (R r * ). Eventually, S returns (R * , g b , h wi , C i , C i , e * ) to A as the response. Similarly, if A issues a send query to user j, then S computes C j = (g bf · h dl ) e * and C j =ê( C j , h 1/d )/ê(h l , h e * ), where e * = H 3 (R r * ). Eventually, S returns (R * , g b , h wj , C j , C j , e * ) to A as the response. Note that S can perfectly simulate the value h wi = h c /h ei/d , and sets e i = H 1 (h wi ||C i ) for user i, S also can simulate the value h wj of user j using the same method.
Finally, S outputs whatever A outputs. If A guesses the random bit correctly, then S can break the EVoDCBDH problem. Hence, we have
Extension
We can extend the above k-time ASH protocol in the two party setting to the multiple party setting using the classic BD broadcasting protocol [10] . The Setup, KeyGen, Register and Tracing algorithms are same as the two party setting, except the Handshake algorithm, which will be described below. Note that we suppose at most n users in the multiple party setting.
-Round 1: User i computes R i = h r i = h H2(ri||xi||si) , r i ∈ R Z q and broadcasts (R i , g ti , h wi , C i ). Note that x i , s i denote the secret key and the secret credential value of user i, and C i =ê(h α , g ti ) xi . Also notice that the indices are taken module n so that user 0 is user n and user i+1 is user 1. and broadcasts (K i , { C j , e j } n−1 j=1,j =i ). Note that s * i = s i · e * i + r i , e * i = H 3 (R i ||H 1 (h wi ||C i )), h s * i+1 = (h wi+1 · h α·H1(h w i+1 ||Ci+1) ) e * i+1 · R i+1 , e * i+1 = H 3 (R i+1 ||H 1 (h wi+1 ||C i+1 )), h s * i−1 = (h wi−1 ·h α·H1(h w i−1 ||Ci−1) ) e * i−1 ·R i−1 , e * i−1 = H 3 (R i−1 ||H 1 (h wi−1 ||C i−1 )).
-Key Derivation: User i verifies the received messages { C j } j =i from n-1 users (it supports batch verification, see below), if either of them fail, then abort; Otherwise, computes the final session key sk i = H 4 (h s * i−1 ·s * i ) n ⊕K n−1 i ⊕ K n−2 i+1 · · · ⊕ K i−2 ). 1. Batch Verification. User i is able to batch verify the received n-1 messages from n-1 users using the small exponents test in [3, 13] . It is easy to see that all users compute the same key.
The k-time ASH protocol in the multiple party setting also achieved session key security, anonymity and public traceability. In particular, the security analysis (including session key security and anonymity) in the two party setting can be extended to the multiple party setting.
Conclusion
In this paper, we proposed a k-time authenticated secret handshake protocol based on the k-time tag bases and anonymized Schnorr signature. We also defined the formal security models for session key security and (full) anonymity, and proved the security of the proposed k-ASK protocol under our proposed complexity assumptions which have been proved hard in the generic bilinear group model.
